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It seems obvious that the sciences do not simply produce piles of unrelated bits 
of knowledge, but it is much less obvious how they provide us with explanations, 
and how these explanations yield understanding about the processes, causes, and 
contents of the natural world. Perhaps the sciences explain by classifying the con-
tents of the world into natural categories of being or what might be called ‘natural 
kinds’. Knowing what kind something is would then greatly inform us about what 
other information we can infer about it, for example knowing what natural kind 
it belongs to means that we know what inferences we can make about it and what 
generalizations apply to it as a member of that kind. Discussions over whether 
these natural kinds exist, what is the nature of their existence, and whether natural 
kinds are themselves natural kinds aim to characterize not only the kinds of things 
that exist in the world but also what knowledge of these categories can provide.
Although philosophically critical, much of the past discussions of natural 
kinds have often answered these questions in a way that is unresponsive to, or 
has actively avoided, discussions of the empirical use of natural kinds and what 
I dub ‘activities of natural kinding’ and ‘natural kinding practices’.1 The natural 
kinds of a particular discipline are those entities, events, mechanisms, processes, 
relationships, and concepts that delimit investigation within it – but we might 
reasonably ask, How are these natural kinds discovered? How are they made? Are 
they revisable? and Where do they come from? A turn to natural kinding prac-
tices reveals a new set of questions open for investigation: How do natural kinds 
explain through practice? What are natural kinding practices and classifications 
and why should we care? What is the nature of natural kinds viewed as a set of 
activities? and How do practice approaches to natural kinds shape and reconfigure 
scientific disciplines?2
Contributors to this volume answer these questions using empirically informed 
evidence-based approaches to natural kinds. They investigate natural kinds using 
practice-based approaches to explore the nature of kindhood and the activities of 
kinding within linguistics, chemical classification, neuroscience, gene and protein 
classification, colour theory in applied mathematics, homology in comparative 
biology, sex and identity theory, memory research, race, extended cognition, sym-
bolic algebra, and geographic information science. Rather than offering a reca-
pitulation of traditional or generalist approaches to the nature of kindhood, this 
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volume seeks to open up an as-yet-unexplored area within the emerging field of 
philosophy of science in practice, in the natural kinds literature, and in the studies 
of scientific classification.
Natural kinds
Natural kinds have traditionally been discussed in terms of how they classify the 
contents of the world. The metaphysical project has been one which identifies 
essences, laws, sameness relations, fundamental properties, and clusters of fam-
ily resemblances3 and how these map out the ontological space of the world. But 
actually how this is done has been less important in the discussion than the result-
ant categories that are produced.
Much of the literature on natural kinds assumes that in order for kinds to be 
natural, they must be mind-independent.4 The standard view of natural kinds and 
of scientific classification is that the source of their naturalness is to be separate 
from human inquiry and activity. For instance, Robin Andreasen’s (1998) version 
of natural kinds grants naturalness to classes only in virtue of their independ-
ence from classifiers: ‘natural biological classification . . . exists independently of 
our classifying activities’5 Alexander Bird and Emma Tobin’s (2015) most recent 
account exemplifies this standard view:
To say that a kind is natural is to say that it corresponds to a grouping that 
reflects the structure of the natural world rather than the interests and actions 
of human beings . . . The existence of these real and independent kinds of 
things is held to justify our scientific inferences and practices.6
To talk of natural kinds has been taken to commit oneself to a certain brand of nat-
uralism. To be natural is to correspond to the way the world is structured accord-
ing to its natural partitioning – a world structure that excludes the influence of 
human scientific activity. It should come as no surprise – given its title Natural 
Kinds and Classification in Scientific Practice – that the present volume rejects 
this reading of naturalness.
To say that there are natural kinds may commit one to some sort of naturalist 
position – that the things to which the kinds refer actually obtain and are adequate 
characterizations of the structure of epistemic space or are accurate representa-
tions of the ontology of the field within which they are used.7 But this commit-
ment does not license the assumption that some univocal understanding of the 
naturalness of natural kinds exists or that to be objective requires they be inde-
pendent of human classifying activities. I contend that natural kinds are thought 
to provide an accurate understanding of the contents of the world conceived of as 
natural in at least three different ways: (1) that there are natural groupings, classi-
fications, or methodologies that exist; (2) that natural kinds pick out these natural 
groupings; and (3) that theories of natural kinds specify the naturalness of kinds in 
their descriptions of the contents of the world. These claims needn’t be a package 
deal. A claim that natural kinds are real may be to hold that the taxonomy of kinds 
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within that field obtains, for example is veridical or realist. But there may be other 
orthogonal notions of natural kinds as being natural that refer to the method of 
investigation, for example it is a natural method if it is the one most appropriate 
to use to investigate the subject matter of our inquiry.
Richard Boyd’s Homeostatic Property Cluster (HPC) Theory8 offers an alterna-
tive approach that does not ground natural kindhood on mind-independence but 
instead on ‘epistemic reliability’.9 For Boyd, a theory of natural kinds is a theory 
of explanatory fit-ness. Natural kinds are those categories and classifications that 
fit the knowledge-seeking questions we ask and aim to answer. They are part of 
the methods we use to describe, categorize, and predict. According to the HPC 
Theory, a theory of natural kinds answers the question, why are these methods, 
classes, or categories epistemologically successful?10 But, despite widespread 
acceptance of the HPC Theory, if the kinds it claims are successful kinds in sci-
ence are actually not, or if it fails to account for kinds that are, then its promise of 
providing an alternative approach to natural kinds that is responsive to scientific 
practice may be wanting.11 Judgement of these kinds as natural kinds seems to 
demand empirical investigation of actual scientific practices as well as inclusion 
of some type of normative assessment about kinds in use to judge between natural 
(or at least useful) kinds and not natural (or unuseful) kinds?
The practice turn
The project of the present volume is to shift philosophical investigation of the 
naturalness of natural kinds to how they are used, discovered, or made. This 
shifts metaphysical inquiry of natural kinds from the contents of the world to the 
activities of partitioning, conceptualizing, comparing, and categorizing – that is 
to ontologizing practices. Instead of bracketing conceptualizing, comparing, and 
classifying as belonging to theory – a domain exclusive of and dichotomous with 
that of practice – theorizing in general and conceptualizing in particular are con-
ceived of as practices. To put it boldly: if there is a category of scientific practices, 
theorizing – insofar as it is a practice of mind – is included within it.
Focusing on scientific practice takes the empirical and experimental 
re-examinations in history and philosophy of science (HPS) and in science and 
technology studies (STS) as catalysts for a broader understanding of what it is 
that we do when we explain and how this allows us to understand that which is 
explained. As such, it can be characterized as part of what has been referred to as 
the practice turn.12 We can best understand this turn to be a turn of our attention 
to scientific action. Justification for this attention to action comes from the recog-
nition that ‘all scientific work, including pure theorizing, consists of actions, of 
the physical, mental, and “paper-and-pencil” operations, to put it in Percy Bridg-
man’s13 terms’.14 This refocusing of science on scientific practices highlights the 
activities that are revealed when we look at the processes and doings of science 
by scientists and scientific communities (e.g. hypothesizing, testing, experiment-
ing, theorizing, measuring) rather than exclusively on the products of science 
(e.g. knowledge, equations, theories).
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The practice turn in philosophy of science is not an apologetic for an 
and-practice-too approach to the metaphysics of science. So-called pure theoretic 
approaches that omit reference to practice succeed in doing so only by assuming 
science and knowledge acquisition to be a subjectless state of affairs – activities 
with no actors, understanding with no one who understands, and modelling with 
no modellers. Hasok Chang15 suggests that the solution to this problem is for us to 
go against the convention of avoiding the second person familiar ‘you’ in our dis-
course, explanations, and discussions. We should (as philosophers and scientists) 
recover the importance of what knowledge is as something you or I understand 
or explain, rather than as disembodied subjectless answers to questions.16 It is 
also what I have referred to elsewhere17 as a turn to a context-driven naturalistic 
agent-based approach or extended agency. Knowledge and adjudication of meth-
ods of investigation (whether epistemological, metaphysical, or valuative) are the 
result of loops of reflectiveness that – in a multi-agent system – construct the 
grounds for objective knowledge through intersubjective judgements.
Simply put, evaluations rely on what people think, what they do, how they do 
it, and how they communicate it to others. These evaluations are dependent on the 
epistemic capabilities of individuals and are multiply instantiated within systems 
of practice. In the biosciences, these systems of practice include human agents, 
but also extend to their physical manipulations (e.g. measuring, weighing, running 
gels), mathematical modelling, proxied or remote tool use, objects of study and 
their modification (e.g. chassis organisms, BioBricks), and the spatially and tem-
porally distributed social communities that they work within (e.g. International 
Human Epigenome Consortium [IHEC], Genome Consortium for Active Teaching 
[GCAT], International Genetically Engineered Machine [iGEM] Competitions).18
Questions posing oppositional alternatives – Does knowledge come from theory 
and inform practice or vice versa? Is science idea driven, data driven, tool driven, 
or practice driven? – frequently devolve into chicken-and-egg arguments over 
causal or at least temporal priority. Underlying these is the assumption that there 
is a unidirectional mode of inquiry – one whose existence could be either charac-
terized as dependent upon us (socially constructed v. antirealist) or independent 
of us (realist v. naturalist). Philosophy of science in practice evaluates these meta-
physical assumptions through critical assessment. That is, we can evaluate concepts 
in the tinkering (Jacob 197719), intervening (Hacking 198320), retuning (Pickering 
200521), re-engineering (Wimsatt 200722), measuring (Chang 200423), kludging 
(O’Malley 201124), and in the verbing (Chang 201125) of science.
Natural kinds after the practice turn
A quick survey of the philosophical terrain of the traditional natural kinds litera-
ture would lead one to think that it is a limited ontological universe – populated 
by tigers, gold, and H2O – objects of classification that have been considered 
quintessential kinds. Chemical kinds in particular remain the go-to natural kind if 
metaphysicians seek what they perceive to be unproblematic, real, objective kinds 
free from mind-dependence. A criticism of traditional metaphysical discussions of 
natural kinds is that they often ignore what science is actually doing when it dubs 
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things as natural kinds and simply assumes (or hopes) that the a priori categories 
of metaphysics coincide with those used in the sciences.26
So what of the concepts traditionally understood as being based on a priori or 
purely theoretic approaches independent of our classifying activities, when we 
take the practice turn seriously? Does the practice turn in philosophy of science 
lead to a new practice-based metaphysics with practice-based notions of kinded-
ness? If so, this would suggest a conception of natural kinds in direct opposition 
to traditional accounts of natural kinds that rely on essences or laws, as well as 
those based on the widely held view that natural kinds must be mind-independent, 
including those of Andreasen,27 Bird,28 and Tobin mentioned earlier.
Natural kinding practices and discipline-making
You, reader, might be thinking: okay, I know what natural kinds are, but what 
does it mean to natural kind something, and what in the world is natural kinding? 
I’ll offer a fairly simple answer in response. ‘Kinding’ and ‘to natural kind’ are 
verbs (e.g. classifying, grouping, identifying, explaining, conceiving, represent-
ing, hypothesizing, tracking, intervening, measuring, testing, modelling, drafting, 
orienting, structuring, comparing, mapping, recording, representing, charting, 
etc.) – words that assert or convey activities or modes of being. They connect the 
subject with the predicate by expressing an action or state of the subject in relation 
to the predicate.
There is also a normative claim concerning methodology. Questions of meta-
physics are best answered by grappling with the science itself, rather than relying 
on toy examples that have been shown to contravene actual scientific practice. If 
understanding the nature of kinding and classifying activities is the aim, we should 
begin by replacing (or at least augmenting) our toy examples with real activities 
within the specific discipline. Exploring the role of these scientific activities ena-
bles critical examination of how (and if) these affect the acquisition of knowledge, 
the context of discovery, and the categorization of the contents of the world.
What might this look like? An introductory example may help.29,30 Species have 
long been discussed as quintessential natural kinds. Whether they are remains a 
topic of much debate. To answer the question of whether species are (or are not) 
natural kinds, we would need to decide what the nature of kindhood for spe-
cies is.31 This would involve a consideration of kinding and classifying practice 
within biological classification. Many (but not all) species concepts aim to define 
the species category in terms of natural lineages and groupings. Addressing the 
naturalness of these lineages and groupings in terms of the practices of natural 
kinding might involve a critical evaluation of the inclusion of ecological models 
into the current extension of ecological evolutionary developmental (eco-evo-
devo) biology, the use of embryological tables to determine developmental stages 
in characterizing life cycles,32 or the use of G-C (guanine-cytosine) composition 
for the determination of phylogenetic distance. The use of models and measure-
ments employed to track the resultant natural groupings and lineages may prove 
to affect the identification of species defined using them. These methods may 
result in non-concordant groupings. Insofar as species concepts aim to define the 
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species category, critical examination of how the use of these measurements and 
models may affect the categorization of species would provide insight from prac-
tice that may reconceive species and naturalness. In a recent paper,33 I make an 
initial attempt to outline a practice approach to natural lineages based on the use 
of epigenetic, behavioural, cultural, and ecological inheritance systems,34 rather 
than exclusively genetic inheritance. In that paper I ask what constitutes a natural 
grouping or lineage if evolution is conceived of as a multidimensional process 
that proceeds by means of multiple routes of inheritance. I suggest that if we 
take this multidimensional approach to lineage seriously, it ultimately affects how 
we conceive of species by extending the kinds of things (i.e. actions, processes, 
events, interactions, causes) that are evolutionarily significant in understanding 
and explicating those things that are considered to belong within the species cat-
egory.35 This re-conception of species comes from and is informed by the mul-
tiplicity of natural kinding practices that are used to track the varied systems of 
inheritance and the lineages that result from these.
Aim and structure
The aim of the volume is to turn past discussions of natural kinds on their head. 
Instead of presenting a metaphysical view of kinds based largely on an unempiri-
cal vantage point, it pursues questions of kindedness which take the use of kinds 
and activities of kinding in practice as significant in the articulation of them as 
kinds. It brings philosophical study of current and historical episodes and case 
studies from various scientific disciplines to bear on natural kinds as traditionally 
conceived of within metaphysics. Focusing on these practices reveals the different 
knowledge-producing activities of kinding and processes involved in natural kind 
use, generation, and discovery.
An evidence-based approach to natural kinds in scientific practice that is 
responsive to empirical practice requires specialists with intimate knowledge of 
their subject matter. This motivated my choice of contributors to this volume. 
I chose contributors who would explore the impact of the practice turn in phi-
losophy and the conceptual consequences of it on the nature of kindhood using 
detailed case studies that exemplify kinding in use. I commissioned these papers 
to be written specifically for this volume, inviting the contributors to focus on 
an area of research that they were familiar with and engage with the activities 
of kinding. Their chapters address the nature of kinds, kindhood, kinding, and 
kind-making in physical chemistry, engineering, critical race theory, mathematics, 
developmental biology, molecular biology, computational neuroscience, cogni-
tive science, linguistics, cartography, and sex and gender studies. Contributors use 
evidence, episodes, examples, and case studies rather than idealized toy examples 
to evaluate scientific practices of classification.
The volume is arranged over four overlapping themes:
I. Explaining practices
II. Kinding and classification
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III. The nature of natural kinds
IV. Shaping scientific disciplines
The papers within each section engage with the theme and related questions 
within different disciplines. Part I, Explaining Practices, focuses primarily on the 
epistemic import of natural kinds and kinding practices. Bernhard Nickel, Hasok 
Chang, and Jackie Sullivan use linguistics, chemistry, and neuroscience (respec-
tively) to show how kinds produce knowledge. Their concentrated discussions 
of the epistemology of practice and kinds as epistemic tools reveal a diversity of 
explanatory aims and approaches to understanding natural kinds. In ‘Explana-
tory Strategies in Linguistic Practice’, Nickel carefully identifies the relation-
ship between explanatory strategies and the phenomena that are circumscribed as 
belonging to the study of linguistics. For instance, if syntactic theory is used to 
assess ungrammaticality, only certain kinds of perceived ungrammaticality will 
be detected. Nickel argues that a discipline is identified through its practices, in 
particular, its explanatory strategies. He provides a focused discussion of how this 
works through attention to three transitions in the history of linguistics. Nickel 
suggests that linguistic kinds are delimited as such through practitioners’ use of 
epistemically sensitive and empirically reliable strategies. He argues that these 
explanatory strategies satisfy the Putnam (1975) and Evans (1982) requirement 
of deference to the world, rather than through the extension of natural kind terms.
Chang’s approach to natural kinds in ‘The Rising of Chemical Natural Kinds 
through Epistemic Iteration’ is in direct opposition to the standard accounts which 
take the naturalness of natural kinds to be in their independence from human 
inquiry. He reveals the developmental framework through which science pro-
gresses – through knowledge-building stages of ‘epistemic iteration’ is human 
dependent. Chang investigates episodes in the history of chemical classification 
that provide detailed evidential support for his position that it is this epistemic 
iterativity rather than the popular natural kind essentialism that underpins the 
kindhood of chemical kinds. Chang’s practice-based naturalism offers a compel-
ling and empirically responsive alternative to the misinformed use of chemical 
kinds in the natural kinds literature. Chang offers a beta-test type ‘suck it and see’ 
approach as a practice-based replacement for the essentialist’s cleaver (used for 
carving nature at its joints). He argues that the nature of chemical kind concepts 
(element, acidity, and phlogiston) is not in the immutable properties of objects 
(e.g. gold = atomic number 79), but in the revisability of their classificatory con-
cepts and resilience in use over epistemic iteration.
Sullivan questions the assumption that the neurosciences will uncover natural 
kinds in ‘Neuroscientific Kinds through the Lens of Scientific Practice’. Explana-
tions within cognitive neuroscience are not developed as explanations for the pur-
poses of providing linked-up accounts of causal processes or mechanisms. They 
are by-products of neuroscientists’ conceptual and experimental practices. She 
argues that they are not intended to delimit kinds and do not attempt to represent 
the world or its joints as they are. Sullivan suggests that the aim of these practices 
is to understand cognitive capacities and which parts of the brain are involved in 
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the performance of these, for example things like face recognition and attention. 
Sullivan is critical of the view that natural kinds will be found as well as of the 
ontic view of mechanism that deemphasizes the role of scientific practice. Propo-
nents of this view claim that mechanisms themselves – rather than scientists – are 
the ones that do the explaining. Sullivan argues that taking the role of conceptual, 
integrative, and experimental practices of neuroscientists on their own terms sug-
gests an antirealism about cognitive kinds.
Part II, Kinding and Classification, is comprised of papers focusing on kinding 
practices and asks both what they are and why we should care about these activi-
ties of classification. Thomas Reydon, Joyce Havstad, Jordi Cat, and I (Catherine 
Kendig) explore classification practices in case studies in diverse sub-disciplines 
of history and philosophy of biology and applied mathematics (including 
nineteenth-century colour categories). Reydon shows how the practice of kind-
ing impacts the natural kind conceptions we use in ‘From a Zooming-In Model 
to a Co-Creation Model: Towards a More Dynamic Account of Classification and 
Kinds’. Two models of conceptual kinding: zooming in and co-creation are evalu-
ated. These are best understood as different kinding strategies. By focusing on 
our activity and the production processes required for kind creation, he builds on 
Boyd’s HPC Theory and on the work of Hacking (1995, 2007a) and in particular, 
his conception of interactive kinds. Reydon analyzes how these kinds of kinds 
are constrained and shaped by nature and by us in his support of a co-creation 
approach. He suggests that kindhood is ultimately kind-making reliant on prac-
tices in a co-created system where there is causal parity between our contribution 
and that played by nature in kinding the world and its contents. Reydon employs 
examples from practices used in tracking sociological classifications and gene 
classification to endorse the co-creation model.
Havstad’s ‘Protein Tokens, Types, and Taxa’ presents a nuanced account of 
the different protein classifications used within scientific practice – those char-
acterizing the concept, identifying the type (or token), and those resolving taxo-
nomic hierarchies. She shows that these protein classifications are orthogonal. 
Past accounts assuming protein classification to be pluralist do so by ignoring 
the diversity of practices and the objects of classification. Whereas practices of 
protein organization are pluralist, the protein individuation practice is monist. She 
argues that to make this judgement requires knowledge of the actual practices of 
protein classification. Havstad shows how the activities and practices of different 
classificatory schemes grant different suites of capabilities.
In ‘The Performative Construction of Natural Kinds: Mathematical Application 
as Practice’, Cat explores the tangle of practices and the dynamism embedded in 
kind construction, formal systems, and classification. He shows how practices are 
sources of norms and principles using case studies from nineteenth-century col-
our classification and fuzzy-set categorization. Rule-based colour research such 
as Maxwell’s (1856/1890) rested on a system of properties, formalizations, and 
algebraic models that were embedded in, as well as sustained by, those empirical 
practices. In turn, these practices provided justification for their use in the catego-
rization of colour. Cat calls these embedded dynamic arrays ‘projects’; these are 
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the units of scientific conduct, vehicles of empirical knowledge acquisition, and 
the locus of practice.
My ‘Homologizing as Kinding’ takes homology to be a natural kind term and 
examines the changing historical and current practices used to identify homo-
logues through the sets of activities that kind them. I suggest the concepts used 
within comparative biology are tuned by these homologizing activities which 
reciprocally are retuned by a new concept of homology. Recent research practices 
in developmental biology and the revised multidimensional approach to evolu-
tion provide evidential support for my suggestion. I evaluate the applicability of 
standard, linear accounts that disallow partial homology. These accounts favour 
an all-or-nothing conception of homology that take two or more traits being com-
pared as either homologous or not. I suggest that if we take the multidimensional 
approach and comparative research practices seriously, these impact what consti-
tutes an inheritance lineage. The upshot – those natural kinding conceptions of 
homology based on lineage require retuning to accommodate this kind of multidi-
mensional homology thinking.
In Part III, The Nature of Natural Kinds, Sally Haslanger, Samuli Pöyhönen, 
and Quayshawn Spencer investigate the nature of natural kinds as kinds within 
the frame of practice. They question the widely held standard view that natural 
kinds are real and their reality is the result of them being mind-independent. 
Haslanger rejects the traditional notion of natural kinds as mind-independent 
in ‘Theorizing with a Purpose: The Many Kinds of Sex’. Relying on examples 
of how sex is categorized, she suggests the opposite. The naturalness of natural 
kinds is not based on their being separate from our minds and independent of 
our experiences, but their naturalness is anchored in our experience and the 
social facts of our purposeful activities. How we differentiate the sexes – male, 
female, intersex – and what are the criteria for membership within these catego-
ries can be answered many ways, but that we can draw a distinction between 
these is not what is most interesting. Haslanger seeks to answer the hard ques-
tion – what is a good way of drawing the distinction? The answer to this ulti-
mately rests on the purposes that we have for intending to make the categorical 
distinction. She suggests that the categorization of male, female, or intersex is 
made within a social context that shapes (and reshapes, sometimes surgically) 
these sites of kinding.
Pöyhönen’s ‘Memory as a Cognitive Kind: Brains, Remembering Dyads, and 
Exograms’ also discusses questions of realism and the nature of natural kinds. His 
agnostic or nonrealist approach attempts to uncover underlying assumptions about 
natural kinds and the various conceptualizations used by tracking the roles they 
play in memory research. He dismisses the assumption, long held in traditional 
discussions of natural kinds, that natural kinds require some sort of metaphysi-
cal commitment. Pöyhönen evaluates traditional, essentialist, and alternatives 
to these. While critical of Boyd’s (2010) pluralist realism apparent in his HPC 
Theory, Pöyhönen builds his defence of an approach to natural kinds applicable to 
cognitive kinds by decoupling Boyd’s assumed connection between metaphysical 
commitments of the reality of kinds with their inductive reliability.
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In ‘Genuine Kinds and Scientific Reality’, Spencer rejects the current trend in 
philosophy that assumes natural kinds, to be natural kinds, must be inductively 
powerful or mind-independent. Using examples of the Native American private 
allele in population genetics among others, he shows (contra Wilkerson 1988, 
Psillos 2002, and Andreasen 1998) how empirically informed natural kinds are 
not only not necessarily realist and mind-independent, but also (contra Boyd 1999 
and Slater 2013) they needn’t be explanatory useful or even epistemologically 
reliable in order to be counted as natural kinds. Spencer seeks to secure a satisfac-
tory theory of genuine natural kinds – one that can predict which kinds are those 
which are natural and which are non-natural by relying on sustained empirical 
success.
The final section, Part IV Shaping Scientific Disciplines, addresses how prac-
tice approaches to natural kinds affect, configure, and in some cases reconfigure 
scientific disciplines. Michael Wheeler, Josipa Petrunic, and Rasmus Winther 
investigate and reconceive the disciplines of cognitive science, nineteenth-century 
symbolic algebra, neuroscience, and cartography in virtue of kinding practices in 
these areas of study. Each examines sites of kinding and agents of kinding through 
diverse empirical activities and within different disciplinary communities.
Wheeler’s ‘A Tale of Two Dilemmas: Cognitive Kinds and the Extended 
Mind’, solves a dilemma that seems inherent in what Rupert (2009) has called 
‘the natural kinds argument for the extended mind’: that the inclusion of extended 
cognitive kinds into the discipline of cognitive science would allow it to explain 
more than one that excluded them. Part of the problem is that if we individu-
ate cognitive kinds, they must be explained by appealing to explanatory factors 
within current human cognitive psychology, but doing so seems to negate the 
explanatory power of the extended parts as cognitive. To avoid this, we could 
try another option – individuate cognitive kinds without appeal to human cogni-
tive psychology – but then those extended elements fail to have cognitive status. 
Wheeler rejects both horns of what he calls Rupert’s Dilemma by appealing to cur-
rent epistemic practices within cognitive science that show that there already exist 
cognitive kinds with extension within the discipline that could serve as bench-
marks to justify extended cognitive kinds.
In ‘Mathematical Kinds? A Case Study in Nineteenth-Century Symbolical 
Algebra’, Petrunic suggests that in order to test the claim in philosophy of math-
ematics that mathematics is composed of kind-like things, we need to look at the 
actual mathematical practice of mathematicians. Petrunic uncovers justification 
for mathematical kinds in historical practice and in mathematicians acting as if 
mathematical kinds exist. Her close examination of the use of symbolic algebraic 
numbers in the work of the nineteenth-century mathematician George Peacock 
(1842, 1845), shows that he behaved as if symbolical algebraic numbers were 
natural kinds. Petrunic argues that behaving, acting, practicing, and treating kinds 
as natural kinds fixes their kindhood, not in any Platonic type of abstraction, but 
in mathematical knowledge in use.
Winther’s ‘Mapping Kinds in GIS and Cartography’ introduces the widely mul-
tidisciplinary study of Geographic Information Science (GIS) and provides a brief 
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history of it, outlining the epistemological and technological structure of a subset 
of the questions it addresses. He characterizes some of the key practices of GIS, 
including data collection, management, map generalization, data modelling, and 
spatial analysis. Winther then provides an outline for a new area of philosophy 
based on mapping kinds. Mapping kinds are not like kinds typically referred to in 
traditional metaphysics. They are at once discovered and made. He argues with 
substantial evidence of current kinding practices that their use in cartography calls 
into question the assumed dichotomies of theory/practice, natural/constructed, and 
other binary views. Winther suggests a close investigation of GIS and cartography 
and an elaboration of a philosophy of mapping kinds may not only reconfigure 
our understanding of mapping, but it may also restructure our thinking about the 
nature of kinds in general.
This volume of new essays is arguably innovative if not unique among the 
panoply of volumes on natural kinds. The essays within it are both philosophically 
rigorous and scientifically informed. It is this, rather than its novelty that justify 
its addition to the already vast literature on natural kinds. As such, the volume 
is intended to be a preliminary and exploratory examination of evidence-based 
approaches to kinding and classifying activities in a broad set of specific discipli-
nary contexts. It is intended to be read by both scientists and philosophers alike. 
Due to the interdisciplinary nature of the papers included, it is equally accessible 
to scientifically curious metaphysicians and epistemologists, philosophers of sci-
ence, and philosophically interested scientists, engineers, and mathematicians. It 
will be an invaluable resource for anyone pursuing research on natural kinds, 
classification, scientific practice, and of course the intersections of these in history 
and philosophy of science, technology, engineering, and mathematics, and within 
science and technology studies.
Notes
1 I explain what I mean by ‘activities of kinding’ and kinding practices in the course 
of this introduction, especially in the sections, ‘Natural Kinding Practices and 
Discipline-Making’. See also chapter 7 in this volume, ‘Homologizing as Kinding’.
2 The four parts of the volume – I. Explaining Practices, II. Kinding and Classifica-
tion, III. The Nature of Natural Kinds, and IV. Shaping Scientific Disciplines – track 
these questions. Chapters within each section respond to these from different scientific 
disciplines.
3 See Wittgenstein, L. (1973) Philosophical Investigations. (3rd edition). Translated 
by G.E.M. Anscombe. New York and London: Pearson, for his discussion on ‘family 
resemblance’ where he suggests that meanings and concepts work not because they 
demarcate necessary and sufficient conditions for kind membership but instead pro-
vide patterns of family resemblance. Natural kinds conceived of in this way mean that 
entities belonging to a kind do not need to share a common feature held by all members 
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